Regulatory Record

Accucaine, a lidocaine hydrochloride injection kit (1%, 10 mg/mL, 5…

Asclemed USA, Inc. has recalled Accucaine, a lidocaine hydrochloride injection kit (1%, 10 mg/mL, 5 mL single-dose ampules) distributed by Enovachem Pharmaceuticals of Torrance, California, under a Class II classification confirmed by…

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Accucaine, a lidocaine hydrochloride injection kit (1%, 10 mg/mL, 5 mL single-dose ampules) distributed by Enovachem Pha — Regulatory Intelligence

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Recall cover for Accucaine, a lidocaine hydrochloride injection kit (1%, 10 mg/mL, 5…
01Primary sourceRegulatory authority record
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Source Context

Record typeRecall
PublishedAug 22, 2026
On this recordRecord overview

    Regulatory Event

    Asclemed USA, Inc. has recalled Accucaine, a lidocaine hydrochloride injection kit (1%, 10 mg/mL, 5 mL single-dose ampules) distributed by Enovachem Pharmaceuticals of Torrance, California, under a Class II classification confirmed by FDA on July 2, 2026. The firm initiated the recall on June 8, 2026, covering nationwide U.S. distribution across two related recall records tied to a single underlying event: one for the Accucaine kit itself (multiple lots, expiring November 2026 and April 2028), and one for the underlying lidocaine ampules manufactured by Sportpharm LLC and distributed under the same Enovachem relationship. The reason for recall, stated identically across both records, is “Lack of Assurance of Sterility.”

    A Class II classification here should not be read as “low severity” in the way that phrase gets used casually. It means FDA has determined the probability of serious adverse health consequences is lower than a Class I event would present, generally because of factors like dose, patient population breadth, or exposure route — not that the underlying manufacturing gap is trivial. Lidocaine HCl injection of this kind is used for local infiltration anesthesia in outpatient and office-based procedures, frequently including injection into tissue with reduced barrier protection at the injection site itself. A sterility assurance gap in an injectable product used this way carries a genuine local-infection risk pathway even where the overall probability FDA assessed is lower than a Class I finding; the classification reflects likelihood, not the absence of a real mechanism of harm. Quality directors who treat every Class II recall as a compliance filing exercise rather than a technical investigation are, in effect, deciding in advance that the manufacturing system finding underneath the classification does not warrant the same rigor as a Class I response — a judgment FDA’s own classification framework does not actually support, since Class I and Class II share the same underlying question of whether the quality system reliably prevented a non-conforming product from reaching distribution.

    What the Record Documents

    What makes this event structurally different from a single-manufacturer sterility finding is that it spans two entities in a kit-assembly relationship: Sportpharm LLC as the manufacturer of record for the lidocaine ampules, and Asclemed USA / Enovachem Pharmaceuticals as the distributor that assembles, labels, and releases the finished Accucaine kit. A “Lack of Assurance of Sterility” finding surfacing under this structure raises a specific question that a single-site sterility finding would not: whether the gap originated in the ampule manufacturing process itself, in a secondary handling, kitting, or repackaging step performed after the ampules left the original manufacturer, or in the sterility assurance documentation and testing hand-off between the two parties. Any of the three is plausible from the information in the recall notice alone, and the distinction matters because the corrective action required is different in each case. Distinguishing between them generally requires reviewing the original manufacturer’s batch sterility and environmental monitoring records for the specific lots involved, the distributor’s incoming-inspection and storage-condition records (including any temperature or time-out-of-controlled-storage excursions during transit or holding), and the kitting operation’s own environmental and personnel controls if the ampules were repackaged, relabeled, or combined with other components in a non-sealed configuration at any point after leaving Sportpharm LLC.

    21 CFR § 211.113(b) requires written procedures to prevent microbiological contamination of products purporting to be sterile, and that obligation does not stop at the original manufacturer’s dock door when a product moves through a distributor or kit-assembler before reaching a healthcare provider. Where a distributor performs any operation on a sterile product beyond simple repackaging of an unopened, fully sealed unit — including kitting multiple components together, applying secondary labeling that involves opening or re-sealing packaging, or storing product under conditions not validated by the original manufacturer — that distributor takes on sterility assurance responsibilities of its own under 21 CFR § 211.192’s production and control record review requirement, and needs a documented basis, not an assumption, for concluding that the original manufacturer’s sterility assurance remained intact through its own handling.

    Technical and Quality Context

    Whether this is an isolated event or a signal of a broader gap in this distributor relationship is difficult to determine from the recall notice alone, since no prior recall history was identified for Asclemed USA, Enovachem Pharmaceuticals, or Sportpharm LLC in available records. That absence of prior history is itself relevant context — it suggests this may be a first-instance finding for this specific kit-assembly relationship rather than evidence of a chronic pattern, though a single facility-spanning sterility finding is still sufficient grounds for FDA and for the companies involved to examine the full chain of custody and testing responsibility between manufacturer and distributor, rather than treating it as resolved once the affected lots are removed from the market.

    Any company operating a distributor or kit-assembly model for sterile injectable products — a common structure for local anesthetics, procedure kits, and convenience-packaged injectables — should independently verify that its quality agreement with the upstream manufacturer explicitly defines which party holds sterility assurance responsibility at each processing step, that any kitting or secondary packaging operation performed after the original manufacturer’s release has its own validated aseptic or sterile-barrier-preserving process, and that complaint and deviation data from both the manufacturer and the distributor are reviewed jointly rather than in separate, disconnected quality systems. This is a routine gap in practice: many distributor-manufacturer relationships for kitted or repackaged sterile products are governed by a purchase agreement that addresses commercial terms in detail but leaves sterility assurance responsibility, complaint-sharing obligations, and joint deviation investigation triggers underspecified or entirely silent, which is precisely the condition that makes root-cause attribution slow and contested after an event like this one occurs.

    Decision Relevance

    This is a gap XGene Consulting is well positioned to help close: supplier and contract-manufacturer qualification programs that clearly define sterility assurance ownership across a manufacturing-to-distribution chain, quality agreement review and gap assessment for kit-assembly and repackaging operations, and corrective and preventive action (CAPA) design that investigates the full chain of custody rather than stopping at the most convenient party. If your organization distributes or assembles kits containing sterile components manufactured elsewhere, this recall is a reasonable prompt to confirm exactly where sterility assurance responsibility sits in your own supply chain, in writing, before FDA asks the question during an inspection.

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